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REVIEW ESSAY
CATCHING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL WAVE:
BERNARD SCHWARTZ'S MAIN CURRENTS IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
The Honorable Robert H. Henryt
MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT. By Bernard Schwartztt.
Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. 1993. 660pp.
[Parrington] failed to see that the history of political ideas too, even
when we look for its total pattern, is composed of particularities; that to
discern its drift, no matter how broad, is a task which requires, as good
criticism does, a certain delicacy of touch.
-Richard Hofstadter
There are signs all about us, in both literary criticism and historical
scholarship, of increasing dissatisfaction--with dry and lifeless mono-
graphs that cautiously explore narrower and even narrower topics; with
cumbersome and too-careful prose that has no ring to it; with technically
demanding and esoteric approaches that have created a divorce, in both
disciplines, between practitioners and the intelligent reading public. Read-
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; formerly Dean and Professor of Law,
Oklahoma City University College of Law, 1991-94; Attorney General of Oklahoma 1987-1991. This paper
was presented in an open forum with the University of Tulsa College of Law faculty, in conjunction with the
inauguration of the "Judge in Residence Program."
it Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. RicHARD HoFsTADTER, THE PRoGREsswE HisToPiANs: TuRNER, BEARD, PARRINOrON 315 (1968).
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ers and scholars of the rising generation may not follow Parrington's
particular judgments or point of view, but it is hard to believe that they
will not still be attracted, captivated, and inspired by his sparkle, his
breadth, his daring, the ardor of his political commitment.2
-- David W. Levy
L INTRODUCTION
Several months ago as I was about to speak at the University of Tulsa
College of Law Burger Court Symposium, a thought occurred as I looked out
over an audience that included some of the great legal scholars of our era. Their
presence and the conference's important topics caused me to term Tulsa the
jurisprudential epicenter of America that day. I also noted-paraphrasing John
F. Kennedy's famous remark about Jefferson,' made to the Nobel laureates
assembled at the White House-that "Never has so much Supreme Court
knowledge been gathered together at Tulsa since the last time Bernard Schwartz
lectured alone." I was thinking primarily, I admit, of what is, to me at least,
Professor Schwartz's magnum opus, Main Currents in American Legal Thought.
Despite its size, 660 pages, this hefty tome is a remarkably terse compendium
of America's greatest gift to the world of ideas-her constitutional jurispru-
dence. After all, it was the great de Tocqueville who noted, in perhaps the
kindest series of observations from a French source about anything non-
French,4 that
the principles on which the American constitutions rest, those principles
of order, of balance of powers, of true liberty, of deep and sincere respect
for right, are indispensable to all republics; they ought to be common to
all; and it may be said beforehand that wherever they are not found, the
republic will soon have ceased to exist.'
It was appropriate to recall the JFK quote. It is also in Main Currents,
though I had forgotten that at the time. And a few other things are also in that
book, which takes us from the Virginia Charter of 1606 to Centesimus Anus of
1991, from the Writs of Assistance Case of 17616 to Texas v. Johnson7 of
1990, from the trial of Captain Thomas Preston of Boston Massacre fame in
1770 to the trials of Rumpole; from a fragmented union to a fragmented juris-
prudence. Along the journey we hear from St. Thomas Aquinas and Hannah
2. David W. Levy, Foreword to 1 VERNON PARRINoTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT at
xii (1987).
3. "I think this is the most extraordinary collection of talent, of human knowledge, that has been gath-
ered together at the White House, with the possible exception of when Thomas Jefferson dined alone." JoHN
BARmET, FAMUIAR QUOTATIONS 891 (15th ed. 1980).
4. If not the kindest French observation, "[it is perhaps, the greatest work ever written on one country
by the citizen of another." Harold J. Laski, Quoted on the book cover of 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOC-
RACY IN AMERICA (Phillips Bradley ed., 1985) (1835).
5. Id. at cvii.
6. The 1761 Writs of Assistance case in colonial Massachusetts was not reported. See M.H. SMmTH, THE
Wrrs oF ASSiSTANCE CASE 231 (1978).
7. 491 U.S. 397 (1990).
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Arendt; from Francis Bacon and Saint Benedict; from Heraclitus, Huxley,
Queen Mary and Prophet Micah; from Richard the Lion-hearted, and Dick the
Butcher. This fascinating vade mecum-to use one of the Professor's terms-is
indeed that, a handbook for ready reference that would grace any working legal
library at home or at the academy.
II. A COMPLETED OVAL
It is ironically appropriate that Professor Schwartz would come to Oklaho-
ma to publish this book. Main Currents is, of course, admittedly based on an-
other Main Currents, Vernon Parrington's Pulitzer Prize winning Main Currents
in American Thought, published in 1927. Parrington's work achieved immediate
and "very nearly unanimous acclaim"8 upon its publication, and as late as 1952
a survey of one hundred prominent American historians revealed that Main
Currents received more votes as a "preferred" work than any other publication,
with only Frederick Jackson Turner's The Frontier in American History, in
second place, being close.9
Although, at least in relatively modem times; American readers have gone
for multi-volume books on weighty subjects (Will and Ariel Durant's contribu-
tions, Mortimer Adler's opera, Copleston's philosophic history, Barclay's theo-
logical commentaries) Parrington's contribution was to reduce to three volumes
a summation of American thought. Inevitably, some eddies are lost in the chan-
neling, but the wider access the work provides, coupled with the revelation of
the relationship between the currents examined, compensates for the loss of
detail. Parrington garnered a Pulitzer for his work, though he did not live long
to enjoy it; Schwartz has more words in print and a more secure intellectual
background than his predecessor, but he nevertheless may have a more limited
audience for this work. A general approach, condensing a vast body of history
into an imminently readable work may not be nuanced enough, or meta-theoret-
ical enough, to please the Academy; rank and file members of the bar, who
sometimes seem uninterested in modem legal theory, may have no interest at all
in a chronicle of the past, even one as well written and important as this. I hope
to encourage both audiences to give this work a closer look. But before I dis-
cuss Schwartz's Currents, irony and history suggest a bit of talk about
Parrington.
mT[. VERNON PARRINGTON
As one historian has observed of Vernon Parrington, there was "an unusu-
ally large gap between the prestige of the critics who welcomed [Main Cur-
8. Levy, supra note 2, at vii.
9. John Walton Caughey, Historian's Choice: Results of a Poll on Recently Published History and
Biography, THE MississiPpI VALLEY -sromcAL REvIEW, Sept. 1952, at 289, 299.
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rents] and the obscurity of the quthor who had produced them."'" Educated
first at the Presbyterian College of Emporia in Kansas, his father, a probate
judge, sent him to Harvard where he spent largely unhappy days reading in the
library. Graduating from the "college yard" he headed straight home to Empo-
ria, teaching at his alma mater until President David Ross Boyd of the six year
old University of Oklahoma hired him to teach at the new "campus"--one
building on a treeless plain-in Norman.
Parrington was hired, in a convention not often seen those days, as a pro-
fessor of English and as the football coach. "Always a masterful and popular
instructor, Parrington taught a bewildering variety of courses-although, curi-
ously, never a single one in American literature."" Limited, as one scholar has
somewhat unkindly observed, by the nearly impossible task of "talking of the
Elizabethans to students whose mastery of English was but a generation,' ' 2
Parrington turned in "this cultural wasteland"'3 to putting prose on paper. The
beginnings of Main Currents can be found among his later Norman papers.
Despite the fact that Parrington was a charming professor-gifted, capable,
idolized by his students-he was caught in a political conflagration. He was
fired in what Richard Hofstadter termed "one of the most scandalous episodes
in American academic history."' 4 Possibly sparked by his occasional igniting
of a cigarette, 5 Parrington was dismissed over a battle between Bryan Demo-
crats who had just assumed command of the new state and their rabidly conser-
vative Southern Methodist allies on one side and Republican college President
David Ross Boyd and a few beleagured voices of academic freedom on the oth-
er. Boyd, Parrington, and seven other faculty members were terminated in a
1909 puritanical purge.
Parrington's elegant dress and comportment belied his progressive and
populist leanings that the Bryan Democrats should have admired. (Indeed, he
had once suggested that "the chief contribution of the Progressive movement to
American political thought was its discovery of the essentially undemocratic
nature of the federal constitution.") 6 But it was his inspired teaching and im-
mense popularity with the students that earned him the enmity of the Reverend
Nathaniel Linebaugh, the Southern Methodist minister who was convinced that
the University was "Godless," with a faculty engaging in "public and indiscrim-
10. Levy, supra note 2, at vii.
11. Id. at viii.
12. H. LARK HALL, V.L PARRONGToN: THROUGH THE AVENUE OF ART 140 (1994).
13. Id.
14. Levy, supra note 2, at viii.
15. Though HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at 373, suggests that cigarette smoking might have been a con-
tributing cause, Professory Levy tells me that other smokers were not discharged.
16. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 199 (1955). William Jennings Bryan, in many ways
the architect of the state constitution of Oklahoma, had termed the ponderous document, loaded with direct
democracy features, "better than the Constitution of the United States." Bryan Democrats believed that the
answer to the problems of democracy was more democracy. Their Oklahoma Constitution has been universal-
ly hailed as a bad example; it has been amended, in less than a century, over 190 times. See generally, Robert
H. Henry, The Oklahoma Constitutional Review Commission: A Call to Arms or the Sounding of Retreat?, 17
OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 177 (1992).
[Vol. 33:385
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inate dance and card parties."' 7 In a letter to the good Reverend, Parrington
had made his case:
[O]fficially I am a teacher of English literature, but in reality my business
in life is to wage war on the crude and selfish materialism that is biting so
deeply into our national life and character, and I do it by teaching whom-
ever I can lay hands on that the worship of materialism can never make a
people either noble or great, but that if we hope to become men we had
better study to learn what things produce manhood. Whatever gifts are
mine are devoted to teaching the need of a high civic and personal moral-
ity: and I mean by morality that integrity of purpose that keeps one up-
right and just and honorable, and that endeavors to enlarge the realm of
sanity and justice and honor in this world.IS
Despite his appeal to justice and honor, Parrington was dishonorably dis-
charged. He retreated, or advanced, to the University of Washington, and re-
warded his new academic home with the publication of his Main Currents.
President Boyd's successor, the dignified Arthur Grant Evans, served with less
controversy, if less distinction, than Boyd. As of this date, Boyd has been hon-
ored by having the University's most distinguished professorships named after
him; Evans got the beautiful Administration Building, now Evans Hall.
Parrington got an oval-but it is now a nice one, especially since it has been
graced by an Alan Houser statue, as well as the seated figure of Oklahoma
University President George Lynn Cross whose most important bon mot was his
explanation to the legislature of his desire to build a university of which the
football team could be proud. 9
IV. BETER DAYS
Now the cycle has perhaps been completed. While Parrington was exported
for doing good work, Schwartz has been imported to do the same. Since 1992,
when Professor Schwartz first came to the University of Tulsa, he has published
about a dozen books, including, in a tribute perhaps to the times and to David
Letterman, A Book of Legal Lists, and, in an acknowledgment of earlier times,
an analysis of Boiling v. Bolling,'o the important pre-revolutionary case that
pitted a young but talented Thomas Jefferson, against his mentor, and the fore-
most lawyer of the day, George Wythe (Jefferson probably won).21
I use Professor Schwartz's work frequently. I have consulted his constitu-
tional law books for quick reference, and his books about the Warren and Bur-
17. David W. Levy, Combating the Image of "Godlessness" in 1909, SOONER MAGAZINE, Spring 1986,
at 28. Cigarette smoking, instead of the more dignified cigars, also evidently promoted the decline of civiliza-
tion. See HALL, supra note 12, at 148.
18. HAuL, supra note 12, at 149.
19. Perhaps Parrington was partially responsible for this legacy. During his tenure as football coach he
introduced some innovations from the East, resulting in a four year record of 9 wins, 2 losses and one tie.
See, GEORGE LYNN CROSS, PREsIDENTS CAN'T PuNT 3 (1977).
20. Boiling v. Boiling was not reported.
21. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND BOLL3NG V. BOING (1997) (reprint-
ing Jefferson's manuscripts detailing arguments made by counsel in Boiling).
1997]
5
Henry: Catching the Jurisprudential Wave: Bernard Schwartz's Main Curren
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1997
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
ger Courts are responsible for any holistic understanding I might possess of
those important Courts. But Main Currents is sui juris for me, and not because
I have cited it in an opinion, but because it is the best terse summary of Ameri-
can Jurisprudence with which I am familiar. It is also-as we say these days-a
good read.
It takes considerable verve to evaluate Professor Schwartz on his home
grounds-particularly because he has so many of them (constitutional law,
administrative law, American legal thought, the Academy in general and the
University of Tulsa in particular). But I want to discuss some of the highlights
of his book, and explain why I think it is so important. I will venture to make a
few of the obligatory criticisms as well-although it is apparent that I am more
an advocate that an adversary.
V. A LIBERAL APPROACH?
Herbert Mitgang, reviewing Main Currents for the New York Times, called
it a
bracing work of scholarship that could inspire readers to think about the
nature of the right-of-center decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States today compared with the rulings by the great liberal justices of the
recent past. The author leaves the clear impression that the liberals on the
bench were much closer to the hearts and minds of the framers of the
Constitution than are Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and the majority
of his colleagues. 2
Although I concur in Mr. Mitgang's result, agreeing with the favorable review,
I disagree with the reasoning (thus I am compelled to write separately!). In fact,
the review is at odds with itself, as a careful consideration of what is perhaps
Schwartz's main current-that of instrumentalism-would reveal.
While Parrington described his own point of view as "liberal rather than
conservative, Jeffersonian rather than Federalistic,"'  and Mr. Mitgang de-
scribes Schwartz's approach as "an even more intense Jeffersonian ap-
proach,"24 the appeal to Jefferson as an icon of liberalism breaks down-if by
liberalism one means what Professor Schwartz describes-and favors-as Con-
stitutional instrumentalism.
Instrumentalism sees the law as "a tool to further ambition and energy; its
job to furnish the legal tools needed for effective mobilization of society's
resources."' To Alexander Hamilton, the key Federalist and a dedicated politi-
cal opponent of Thomas Jefferson, the law was a means to an end; Hamilton
rejected strict construction of even the Constitution when it got in the way of
desired practical results. Jefferson, though also an instrumentalist in many ways,
22. Herbert Mitgang, The Constitution: Is It Organic or Cast in Stone?, N.Y. TIME, July 7, 1993, at C1.
23. Ld.
24. Id.
25. BE NARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMcRIAN LEGAL THouGHT 31 (1993).
[Vol. 33:385
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did not agree with such "liberal" constructions of the Constitution. This consti-
tutional instrumentalism was the subject of the last great battle between these
two American titans.
The legally self-educated Hamilton was one of the leading attorneys of the
New York Bar (indeed, his bar study notes served as the first treatise on proce-
dure in New York). But his brilliant career as a practicing attorney was eclipsed
by his career as a legal statesman. And although Hamilton's initial desire to
create something approaching a monarchy' with his close friend General
Washington crowned as "his high Mightiness," failed, his contribution to Amer-
ican Law was regal in its own right.
Hamilton's two great judicial successes, in which he played, shall we say,
an instrumental role, were the doctrine of judicial review, established by
Marbury v. Madison,27 and the doctrine of implied powers, established by
McCulloch v. Maryland. As the leading Federalist of his day, Hamilton's
strong efforts on behalf of the Constitution are well known. A co-author of the
enormously influential Federalist Papers (he wrote about two-thirds of them),
he might have been expected to seek a political career and further advance his
goals of a strong central government in the legislative or executive branch. But
it was Hamilton the author, not the statesman, who first made an effective case
for judicial review. His essay, The Federalist No. 78, virtually created the doc-
trine and, as Schwartz says, "stands, indeed, as the classic pre-John Marshall
statement on the subject. American constitutional law has never been the same
since it was published."29
Hamilton's argument for giving this power to the judiciary for the first
time in history was theoretically brilliant and tactically sound. He based the
concept on this foundation: the grant of power to the Constitution from the
people was limited. The people retained most of the powers of government,
especially with respect to the legislature. The colonists had seen what Parlia-
ment, the British legislature, could do to them. They enshrined in the Constitu-
tion several things that Congress, the American legislature, could not do-bills
of attainder, ex post facto laws-more would come later in the Bill of Rights.
The only way, Hamilton argued, to control the legislative branch-to prevent
the parliamentary evils the colonists had just freed themselves from-was to
26. Perhaps Hamilton is unduly criticized for his June 18th speech at the Constitutional Convention.
Catherine Drinker Bowen gives a balanced view in her classic, Miracle at Philadelphia. She summarizes:
Alexander Hamilton was to pay a price for his speech of June eighteenth; for the rest of his life it
would rise to harass him. When the moment came his enemies made much of it. They said the Con-
stitution had "an awful squinting towards monarchy," and that Hamilton wanted an American king.
Hamilton denied it, declared that what he said that day had been compounded of "propositions made
without due reflection," then denied even that he had advocated a President with life tenure. Such a
denial, Madison wrote blandly from Virginia, was due "to a want of recollection."
CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 115 (1986). Although some have suggested that
Hamilton's speech was merely a tactic to move the convention toward a more powerful centralized govern-
ment and away from the splintered confederation that existed, it seems that his want of recollection confirms
that he did indeed go too far.
27. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
29. SCHWAR17_, supra note 25, at 27.
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give the courts of justice the power to declare as void acts that conflicted with
these express limitations.
Not until 1803 did Jefferson's distant kinsman and arch political foe John
Marshall translate Hamilton's essay into judicial prose. The victory came at a
relatively small price-a Federalist spear-carrier did not get a patronage posi-
tion. But the Federalists' idea of a strong central government was advanced by
the only branch of government they controlled-the Supreme Court-getting to
say what the law finally was. The victory was clearly Hamilton's. As Professor
Schwartz concludes, "The Marbury opinion can, indeed, be read as more or less
a gloss upon The Federalist, No. 78."3o
The Sage of Monticello had actually once supported judicial review: Recall
that Jefferson's distrust of centralized power had led him to oppose the Consti-
tution as drafted because it did not adequately protect individual rights. While
in France as the American ambassador succeeding Benjamin Franklin,3 he
began his advocacy for a bill of rights. His close friend, James Madison, had
suggested that such a document would merely be a "parchment barrier" that
could protect no one. 2 Jefferson replied that Madison had failed to consider
one argument "which has great weight with me, the legal check which it puts
into the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which if rendered independent,
and kept strictly to their own department merits great confidence for their
learning and integrity."'33
Perhaps the emphasized language in the preceding quotation provided
Jefferson some wiggle room, for he would later reject and disavow his support
for judicial review. "I have long wished," he afterwards wrote, "for a proper
occasion to have the gratuitous opinion in Marbury v. Madison brought before
the public [and] denounced as not law."34 Schwartz recalls many Jeffersonian
diatribes against judicial review: it was "a very dangerous doctrine indeed,"
making the Constitution "a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary."'35
It gives the right to prescribe rules for the other branches by a branch which "is
unelected by, and independent of the nation."'36 The judiciary "like gravity,...
with noiseless foot, and unalarming advance, gaining ground step by step; and
holding what it gains, is ingulphing insidiously the special governments into the
jaws of that which feeds them."37
Professor Schwartz also details the Hamiltonian/Jeffersonian battle over the
30. Id. at 28.
31. Jefferson himself answered a lady of the French Court who asked if he had come to take Dr.
Franklin's "place.' "The Virginian replied that he was Dr. Franklin's successor, but that no one could take his
place." LEON A. HARRIS, THE FINE ART OF PoLITICAL Wrr 45 (1964).
32. SCHwARTZ, supra note 25, at 68 (citing 1 BERNARD SCHwAR1T, THE BEL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY 616 (1971) [hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS]).
33. Id. (citing 1 BI.L OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 620) (emphasis added).
34. Id. (citing 9 THE WRn7iNGS OF THoMAS JEFFERSON 54 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1898) [hereinafter JEFFER-
SON]).
35. Id. at 69 (citing 10 JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 160).
36. Id. (citing 10 JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 140-41).
37. Id. (citing 10 JEFFERSON, supra note 34, at 189).
[Vol. 33:385
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doctrine of implied powers that culminated in McCulloch v. Maryland.8 When
Congress passed a bill providing for the creation of the Bank of the United
States, President Washington received conflicting advice from his key advisors
as to its constitutionality. Attorney General Randolph and Secretary of State
Jefferson, fellow old Dominioners with the President, advised that the act was
unconstitutional as Congress had limited powers in the first place, and further,
that the power to grant a charter of incorporation had not been delegated to
Congress.39
As Schwartz explains,
Hamilton took an entirely different approach. He was one of those
'men... disposed to do the essential business of the Nation by a liberal
construction of the powers of the Government.' Hence, his basic rule of
constitutional interpretation was 'the necessity [and] propriety of exer-
cising the authorities intrusted to a government on principles of liberal
construction.'"
Jefferson would counter with the argument that "[t]o take a single step beyond
the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress is to take
possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any defini-
tion."'41 Hamilton would respond that "an adherence to the letter of [the
Constitution's] powers would at once arrest the motions of the government."'42
He continued, "such is the plain import of the declaration, that [Congress] may
pass all laws necessary [and] proper to carry into execution those powers."43
Again, the words of the New York lawyer:.
[Niecessary often means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, use-
ful, or conducive to. It is a common mode of expression to say, that it is
necessary for a government or a person to do this or that thing, when
nothing more is intended or understood, than that the interests of the
government or person require, or will be promoted, by the doing of this or
that thing.44
Hamilton's reading would again prevail. Chief Justice John Marshall's
opinion in McCulloch noted: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plain-
ly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."'4 Schwartz concludes with a
thought well-known by many constitutional scholars but perhaps not so well-
known among the populace at large:
It was thus Hamilton who laid the foundation on which the Marshall
38. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
39. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 29.
40. Id. (citing 12 TIM PAPERS OF AI.EXANDER HAMILTON 251 (1961) [hereinafter PAPERS OF HAMIL-
TON]; and 8 id. at 105).
41. Id. (citing SAMUEL 3. KONEFSKY, JOHN MARSHALL AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON 67(1964)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 30 (citing 8 PAPERS OF HAMILTON, supra note 40, at 106).
44. Id. (citing 8 PAPERS OF HAMILTON, supra note 40, at 102).
45. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
1997]
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Court built the two essential doctrines of judicial review and implied
powers. Hamilton also enunciated the interpretation of the General Wel-
fare Clause which the Supreme Court has come to accept, as well as the
broad concept of presidential power that has come to prevail during the
present century. Indeed, it may be said that the current interpretation of
the Constitution is essentially Hamiltonian in character. The important
issues of public law, on which Hamilton differed with those who favored
the canons of strict construction, have ultimately been resolved in favor of
Hamilton's view.'
Noting Schwartz's admiration of Hamilton's constitutional theories, we can
perhaps better understand Schwartz's fealty to the idea that the law should be
interpreted according to our current needs. Our jurisprudence, he would argue,
bears out the truth of Paul's second Letter to the Corinthians, that the letter kills
but the spirit gives life.47 It is not surprising that young lawyer Alexander
Hamilton used that very allusion in his argument in 1784 in the important New
York case Rutgers v. Waddington,' which is often referred to as a forerunner
of Marbury.
Judge Posner, who himself occupies a deservedly significant place in Main
Currents, would today describe the Hamiltonian view as "pragmatic." In his
captivating book Overcoming Law he uses these adjectives to characterize the
pragmatic outlook: "practical, instrumental, forward-looking, activist, empirical,
skeptical, antidogmatic, experimental."'49  Hamilton's pragmatism, his
instrumentalism, permitted America to create the strong economy that allowed
the nation to succeed internationally, and indeed to survive the Civil War.
Thus, to the extent that this instrumentalism has been vindicated, it is
Hamilton who deserves the credit, and not the equally proficient lawyer with
the "peculiar felicity of expression," Thomas Jefferson. The question of whether
the Constitution, as the Mitgang review asked, is "Organic or Cast in Stone?"
indeed dominates the pages of Main Currents. And, yes, I agree that Schwartz
favors the instrumentalist or pragmatic outlook.
VI. MORE CURRENTS
Schwartz takes us through more currents in "The Golden Age" where
instrumentalism under the first "Superchief," John Marshall, and his young
intellectual Patroclas, Justice Story, reigned triumphant. As James Garfield said,
"Marshall found the Constitution paper, and he made it power. He found a
46. ScHwARTl, supra note 25, at 31 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
47. See 2 Corinthians 3:6; 1 THE LAW PRACiCE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 359 (Julius Goebel, Jr., ed.,
1964) [hereinafter PRACrICE OF HAMILTON] (Hamilton's notes from argument in Rutgers v. Waddington that
"in law as in religion letter kills"). See also Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal
Foundationalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 48-51 (1993) (suggesting that differences in constitutional ideas of
Jefferson and Marshall may relate to their differing religious backgrounds).
48. N.Y. City Mayor's Ct., 1784 (unreported), reprinted in 1 PRACTICE OF HAMILTON, supra note 47, at
393-419.
49. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 11 (1995) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 33:385
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skeleton, and he clothed it with flesh and blood." Schwartz concludes that
[elarly American instrumentalist jurisprudence reached its climax in Mar-
shall. More than any other jurist, Marshall employed the law as a means
to attain the political and economic ends that he favored. In this sense, he
was the very paradigm, during our law's formative era, of the result-ori-
ented judge. More than that, the law which he thus used was, in major
part, molded as well as utilized by him. That is all but self-evident as far
as Marshall's public-law decisions are concerned: 'he hit the Constitution
much as the Lord hit the chaos, at a time when everything needed creat-
ing.' The constitutional principles which Marshall proclaimed in his cathe-
dral tones were, in large part, principles of his own creation."
But Marshall's instrumentalism, based on his common law background,
was not to prevail unchallenged. Schwartz explains how positivism supplanted
the instrumentalism of Marshall, Hamilton, and even Jefferson (who was instru-
mentalist in areas of law other than constitutional law; indeed, he could make
use of implied powers too-for example, by purchasing Louisiana). Positivism,
a more negative and restraintist concept of law, was described by a Kentucky
court in a slavery case: "the law as it is, and not as it ought to be." 2 Slavery
so conspired with positivism that the old law of the grand manner came to be
replaced by the beginning of the Civil War with law as a narrower, blackletter,
more party-centered, technical science. Indeed, the law as a creative and innova-
tive endeavor had so declined, as Schwartz relates, that when the young Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., told his father that he was going to Harvard Law School,
Dr. Holmes inquired: "What is the use of that? A lawyer can't be a great
man."
53
Schwartz continues through "The Crucible" of the Civil War, as Abraham
Lincoln sought to deal with "Law in Emergency," and the second American
Revolution occurred, that brought with it an almost new Constitution with the
Civil War amendments. 54 We travel through "The Gilded Age" where the
modern Justinians sought to establish the laws in codes, but were repelled by
common law lawyers. The Code of David Field was repulsed by the unwritten
law of life and society advocated by James C. Carter. In actuality, it was a
50. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 112 (citing CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR
402 (1913)).
51. Id. at 125 (quoting JOHN PAUL FRANK, MARBLE PALACE 62 (1972)) (footnote omitted).
52. Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 470 (1820).
53. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 196 (citing CATHERINE DRINIER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS:
JUSTTCE HOLMES AND HIs FAMILY 201 (1944)).
54. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION at vii-
viii (1990).
Yet the Civil War changed the United States as thoroughly as the French Revolution changed that
country. The liberation of four million slaves, along with destruction of the South's political domina-
tion of national affairs and of the social order on which that domination was founded, metamor-
phosed as region (the former slave states) more than three times as large as France. The future of
America after 1865 belonged to a system of democratic free-labor capitalism, not one of slave-labor
plantation agriculture. The House Divided of 1858 was no longer divided. Liberty took on new mean-
ings for Americans. The old decentralized federal republic became a new national polity that taxed
the people directly, created an internal revenue bureau of collect these taxes, expanded the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts, established a national currency and a national banking structure" Id.
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defeat for instrumentalism, for Field argued for the pragmatic use of the law, a
recasting of the positive law "to fit the needs of the new society and its bur-
geoning economy."'
As "The New Century" began, judge-made common law reigned supreme.
But the acknowledged master of that law, Holmes, delivered his lectures on the
common law that presaged the "legal limbo"" to which Holmes himself would
later relegate the common law. As Schwartz describes it, "[t]hough Holmes was
eminently a legal historian, whose greatest work was an historical analysis of
common law doctrine, he rejected the negative attitude of the then-prevailing
historical school of jurisprudence. To him there was no inevitability in either
history or law, except as men made it."
Though Holmes admired John Marshall above all legal others, ("If Ameri-
can law were to be represented by a single figure, skeptic and worshipper alike
would agree that the figure could be one alone, and that one, John Mar-
shall"), 8 his own concept of law was essentially positivist. Although Holmes'
concept of the law is difficult to completely fit into any category (made even
more so by his sometimes selective practice of say, his rule of restraint), he was
clearly a positivist. The goal for the judge was "that men should know the rules
by which the game will be played. Doubt as to the value of some of those rules
is no sufficient reason why they should not be followed by the courts."59
Yet Holmes' positivism "opened the door," Schwartz shows us, for the
twentieth century conception of law, even though "he himself did not enter
fully into the legal edifice that lay beyond." "[The judges themselves [had]
their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage."' It was not logic
but, as everyone recalls the aphorism, experience that was the life of the law.
The "felt necessities of the time" have been the primary force.
It is in describing these great figures of the law that Schwartz is at his
best. In remarkably brief chapters he catches the wave, blending the words of
his subjects with his own. Of Holmes:
His own economic views did not lead Holmes to try to use the law to
further them. The Sherman Act, he wrote, "I loathe and despise." Howev-
er, "I don't mean to let my disbelief in the act affect my application of
it." As he once put it, "I am so skeptical as to our knowledge of the
goodness or badness of laws that I have no practical criterion except what
the crowd wants." He may have disagreed with the crowd in the given
case, "but that is immaterial." The law may have been an instrument to
meet the society's needs; yet Holmes never thought it his function to
oppose what he saw as expressions of society's will even when those
expressions were, in his opinion, based upon "economic delusion." The
55. SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 361.
56. Id. at 373.
57. Id. at 380.
58. Id. at 112 (citing THE MIND AND FArmH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 385 (1943)).
59. Id. at 390 (citing OLPvER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS 289 (1920) [hereinaf-
ter HOLMES]).
60. Id. at 392.
61. Id. at 392-93 (citing HOLMES, supra note 59, at 184).
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Holmesian posture was pithily expressed in a comment he once made to
Justice Stone: "Young man [Stone was sixty-one years old at the time],
about seventy-five years ago I learnt that I was not God. And so, when
the people... want to do something I can't find anything in the Constitu-
tion expressly forbidding them to do, I say, whether I like it or not,
'Goddamit, let 'er do it!"'"2
Schwartz points out that Holmes' restraint led to his reluctance to invali-
date regulatory legislation such as that contemplated in Lochner v. New York.'
Thus he was lionized as the great "liberal " of the bench. But he was "liberal
only in the nineteenth century use of the term," Schwartz reminds us." Per-
haps "libertarian" might be more descriptive, although that term leaves some-
thing to be desired. (Maybe "libertine" would be helpful as well: I have always
assumed the quotation attributed to Holmes in his nineties upon observing the
passing of an attractive young woman, "Oh, to be seventy again!, ' '" to be ac-
curate.)
Although Holmes' views were not accepted by the majority of judges of
his time, Schwartz contends with Marc Antony by observing that the good that
men do does lives after them: "If the nineteenth century was dominated by the
passive jurisprudence [of positivism], the twentieth was, ultimately, to be that of
Mr. Justice Holmes."
Chapter Six discovers the second great creative period in American law-a
period in which many of us have lived. Schwartz is captivating in treating this
time of "Pragmatic Instrumentalism" that he has observed and catalogued for
almost fifty years. Chapter Seven intriguingly discusses the "Fragmented Juris-
prudence" of our own day which encompasses Nobel Laureate Alexander
Solzhenitsyn's view "that there are no stable and universal concepts of jus-
tice.., that all of them are fluid." 7 In this time we have witnessed jurispru-
dence from the "dignity vs. deference"' debate of Justices Brennan and
Rehnquist, to feminist jurisprudence, law and economics, critical race theory,
critical legal studies, and "Pomobabble." '69
With respect to the "New Century," are we now seeing a rebirth of those
views a la Richard Epstein and others, that were thoroughly repudiated by
Holmes? Has our limitation of "contract" stifled innovation and creativity just
as unbridled laissez faire stifled the growth of a middle class by concentrating
wealth? To read Schwartz here is to be forewarned about the next possible
paradigm shift of jurisprudential science.
62. Id. at 393 (footnotes omitted).
63. 98 U.S. 45 (1905).
64. SCHWAR7z, supra note 25, at 394.
65. BARTLETT, supra note 3, at 645.
66. SCHWARTz, supra note 25, at 394.
67. Id. at 553.
68. This dichotomy is the theme of Peter Iron's book, Brennan v. Rehnquist: The Battle for the Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., PETER IRON, BRENNAN V. REHNQUIS'. THE BATr"E FOR THE CONSTTTION at xi (1994).
69. Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the Unini-
tiated, 95 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
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Indeed, science's influence on jurisprudence is hinted at throughout the
book. Despite Holmes' rejection of Herbert Spencer's social Darwinism (by the
way, have you noted that modem social Darwinists are seldom Darwinists?)
perhaps a principal question rejected by Holmes remains: can (and/or ought) the
law to be reduced to scientific principles-to the "axioms and corollaries of a
book of mathematics?"7 Can all observations, objects, and even experiences
be defined in the language of mathematics and/or science, or is such a unified
theory the result of a modernist scientism that can never address the formation
and allocation of legal values? Will the fragments finally coalesce into a couple
of competing theories, or has some sort of big-bang shattered jurisprudence
forever, ending it as Fukuyama suggests of history and James Horgan suggests
of science?7'
Before I close, it is essential, especially when you are as complimentary as
I have tried to be, to mention some criticisms. Here goes.
First, the book is long. At 644 pages of text, it is not airplane reading.
Indeed, most practitioners are not going to think they have time to read such a
weighty volume. This is unfortunate, because the volume is immensely read-
able, and the chapters are organized in such a way that the reading can be bro-
ken up. Further, the book is really more of a handbook or reference volume
anyway, though eminently readable. Not much criticism here.
Second, the book is an admitted imitation of Parrington. That too, is not
much of a fault, but it may cause some hoity-toity reviewers to ignore the work.
I recall a story that Ben Franklin recounted in his Autobiography. He described
a Presbyterian minister whose sermons were extremely popular until Philadel-
phians, perhaps not always known for brotherly love, found out that many of
his oral messages were borrowed. Somewhat oddly, the patron saint of printers
was not in the least offended. What difference should it make who wrote the
words of an oral sermon that was excellent? There was no direct claim of au-
thorship. Franklin stood by the minister noting, "I rather approved of his giving
us good sermons composed by others than bad ones of his own manufacture,
though the latter was the practice of our common teachers."
Here the fault is not really analogous: Professor Schwartz, an uncommon
teacher, adapts Parrington's method of historical criticism to analyze of Ameri-
can jurisprudential history. It is not imitation of the work, but application of the
form.
Third, the book is written in the grand manner. It generalizes; it has cryptic
footnotes at times (but praise God they are not lengthy, and they are not law
review style); and it repeats. The book might have profited from another editor.
But again, my criticisms fail. Who could easily edit Bernard Schwartz's work?
70. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1963).
71. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 3; and JOHN
HORGAN, THE END OF SCIENCE 242-43 (1996) (citing FRANcis FuKuYAMA, TiE END OF HISTORY AND THE
LAST MAN 204-06 (1992)).
72. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER WRmNGS BY BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 92 (Peter Shaw ed., 1982).
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Eschewing the turgid, law review style that has beaten the life out of modem
academic legal prose, Schwartz has summarized the great themes of American
law in a way that only an observer with his season (should I say seisin?) could
properly do. In fact, I believe Schwartz has through his observations given us a
summary of much of his life as well. At its absolute worst, this tome is a re-
flection of a classic. At its best, it is a classic, revealing as does Parrington,
how a scholar like Schwartz views American legal thought across the disci-
plines.
VII. CONCLUSION
Schwartz decries the mediocrity of fragmented jurisprudence. He longs for,
and claims the eventual return of, the days when the gods walked among us. If
that day comes, will it be Eden or Gotterdamerung? Until we find out, the
words of this Homeric Epic will guide us in thinking about the currents and
eddies that flow as does Marcus Aurelius' river of time: "Time is a sort of river
of passing events, and strong is its current; no sooner is a thing brought to sight
than it is swept by and another takes its place, and this too will be swept
away." For those who long for the past, surely Schwartz holds out the hope
that we will see it again.
73. BARTLErT, supra note 3, at 124.
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